Stochastic game theory: For playing games, not just for doing theory
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Publication:4525768
DOI10.1073/pnas.96.19.10564zbMath0962.91008OpenAlexW2034086678WikidataQ30304273 ScholiaQ30304273MaRDI QIDQ4525768
Charles A. Holt, Jacob K. Goeree
Publication date: 24 January 2001
Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.96.19.10564
coordination gamesevolutionary dynamicslearning dynamicssocial dilemma gamesiterated noisy introspectionlogic equilibrium
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