Trembling hand perfection for mixed quantal/best response equilibria
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
- Dynamic fictitious play, dynamic gradient play, and distributed convergence to Nash equilibria
- Dynamic noncooperative game theory
- Games with imperfectly observable commitment
- Learning mixed equilibria
- Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium
- Nash equilibrium and minimax theorem with \(\mathcal C\)-concavity
- Note on noncooperative convex games
- On the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
- Stochastic game theory: For playing games, not just for doing theory
- The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
- Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
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