Trembling hand perfection for mixed quantal/best response equilibria
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Publication:532697
DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0169-2zbMATH Open1211.91023OpenAlexW2088852022MaRDI QIDQ532697FDOQ532697
Authors: David Wolpert 
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0169-2
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Cites Work
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