Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
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Publication:5287206
DOI10.2307/2951717zbMath0792.90096OpenAlexW2143100276MaRDI QIDQ5287206
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
Publication date: 15 August 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64280
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