Organizational strategy and tacit collusion in oligopoly with agency

DOI10.1007/BF01307826zbMATH Open0841.90021MaRDI QIDQ1908548FDOQ1908548

Authors: Richard M. Cyert, Praveen Kumar 

Publication date: 24 July 1996

Published in: Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy
• Optimal collusion with internal contracting
• Learning to collude tacitly on production levels by oligopolistic agents
• Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
• Faking Patience with Tacit Collusion

zbMATH Keywords

business cycleagencyorganizational structuredynamic price competition in oligopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

Cites Work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
• Multiperiod Decision Models with Alternating Choice as a Solution to the Duopoly Problem
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium

Cited In (3)

• Learning to collude tacitly on production levels by oligopolistic agents
• A cooperative analysis of covert collusion in oligopolistic industries
• The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth

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