Organizational strategy and tacit collusion in oligopoly with agency

DOI10.1007/BF01307826MaRDI QIDQ1908548zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Richard M. Cyert, Praveen Kumar

Publication date 24 July 1996

Published in Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

business cycleagencyorganizational structuredynamic price competition in oligopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

Recommendations

• Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy
• Optimal collusion with internal contracting
• Learning to collude tacitly on production levels by oligopolistic agents
• Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
• Faking Patience with Tacit Collusion

Cites work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Multiperiod Decision Models with Alternating Choice as a Solution to the Duopoly Problem
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium

Cited in

(4)

• Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy
• Learning to collude tacitly on production levels by oligopolistic agents
• The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth
• A cooperative analysis of covert collusion in oligopolistic industries

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