Learning to collude tacitly on production levels by oligopolistic agents

DOI10.1007/S10614-008-9150-6MaRDI QIDQ842802zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steven O. Kimbrough, Frederic H. Murphy

Publication date 25 September 2009

Published in Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1215&context=oid_papers

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot competitionagent-based modelingoligopolylearning in gamesproduction quantity decision making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 194738 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
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• How robust is the equal split norm? Responsive strategies, selection mechanisms and the need for economic interpretation of simulation parameters
• LEARNING IN COBWEB EXPERIMENTS
• Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games
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• The evolution of cooperation

Cited in

(3)

• Probe and adjust in information transfer games
• Strategic bidding of offer curves: an agent-based approach to exploring supply curve equilibria
• From imitation to collusion: long-run learning in a low-information environment

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Uses Software

• R

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