Learning to collude tacitly on production levels by oligopolistic agents

DOI10.1007/S10614-008-9150-6zbMATH Open1170.91421OpenAlexW1992479209MaRDI QIDQ842802FDOQ842802

Authors: Steven O. Kimbrough, Frederic H. Murphy 

Publication date: 25 September 2009

Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1215&context=oid_papers

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zbMATH Keywords

Cournot competitionagent-based modelingoligopolylearning in gamesproduction quantity decision making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Handbook of computational economics. Vol. 2: Agent-based computational economics
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• Breeding Competitive Strategies
• Q-learning agents in a Cournot oligopoly model
• How robust is the equal split norm? Responsive strategies, selection mechanisms and the need for economic interpretation of simulation parameters
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Cited In (3)

• From imitation to collusion: long-run learning in a low-information environment
• Strategic bidding of offer curves: an agent-based approach to exploring supply curve equilibria
• Probe and adjust in information transfer games

Uses Software

• R

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