Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games
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Publication:4531018
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00212zbMath1032.91546OpenAlexW2149861319MaRDI QIDQ4531018
Larry Samuelson, John B. Van Huyck, Raymond C. Battalio
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/180275
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