Simulating the effect of nepotism on political risk taking and social unrest

DOI10.1007/S10588-006-9008-1zbMATH Open1101.91357OpenAlexW2006062777MaRDI QIDQ857729FDOQ857729

Authors: Lawrence A. Kuznar, William G. Frederick 

Publication date: 20 December 2006

Published in: Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10588-006-9008-1

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zbMATH Keywords

InequalityAgent-based modelingNepotismRisk sensitivitySocial unrestTerrorism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

• Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (1)

• Repression of satisfaction as the basis of the emergence of old world complex societies

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