Solving coordination failure with ``all-or-none group-level incentives

DOI10.1007/s10683-007-9179-8zbMath1136.91359OpenAlexW3122190940MaRDI QIDQ2463425

John Hamman, Roberto A. Weber, Scott Rick

Publication date: 6 December 2007

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9179-8

zbMATH Keywords

CoordinationExperimentsIncentivesOrganizations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (5)

Communication, leadership and coordination failure ⋮ Coordination under loss contracts ⋮ Strategic risk and coordination failure in blame games ⋮ Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination ⋮ Leading to efficient coordination: individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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• The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
• An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
• Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
• The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study
• Loss avoidance as selection principle: evidence from simple stag-hunt games
• An experimental study of costly coordination
• Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
• Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games
• Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games

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