Solving coordination failure with ``all-or-none group-level incentives

DOI10.1007/s10683-007-9179-8zbMath1136.91359MaRDI QIDQ2463425

Roberto A. Weber, Scott Rick, John Hamman

Publication date: 6 December 2007

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9179-8

zbMATH Keywords

Coordination; Experiments; Incentives; Organizations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games

91A90: Experimental studies

Related Items

Strategic risk and coordination failure in blame games

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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