An experimental study of costly coordination

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.08.006MaRDI QIDQ2485486zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt

Publication date 5 August 2005

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://authors.library.caltech.edu/5767/

zbMATH Keywords

logit equilibriumout-of-sample predictionstochastic potential

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium
• Noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games
• Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games
• Potential games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Stochastic game theory: For playing games, not just for doing theory
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

Cited in

(17)

• The cost of collaboration
• Strategic risk and coordination failure in blame games
• Communication, leadership and coordination failure
• Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs
• Solving coordination failure with ``all-or-none group-level incentives
• A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments
• Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium
• When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory
• Cognitive ability and the effect of strategic uncertainty
• Leading to efficient coordination: individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game
• The optimal strategy in the minimum effort game
• Two ``little treasure games driven by unconditional regret
• All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study
• Which hat to wear? Impact of natural identities on coordination and cooperation
• Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game
• Step thinking and costly coordination
• Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination

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