An experimental study of costly coordination

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.006zbMath1099.91032WikidataQ59938136 ScholiaQ59938136MaRDI QIDQ2485486

Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt

Publication date: 5 August 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/5767/

zbMATH Keywords

logit equilibrium; stochastic potential; out-of-sample prediction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A90: Experimental studies

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