An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90004-XzbMath0825.90836MaRDI QIDQ1192634

Vincent P. Crawford

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

92D15: Problems related to evolution

91A80: Applications of game theory

92D25: Population dynamics (general)

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