Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
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Publication:1201137
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90036-HzbMath0758.90092OpenAlexW2080158665MaRDI QIDQ1201137
Publication date: 17 January 1993
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90036-h
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01)
Related Items (13)
Search, evolution, and money ⋮ Evolution in mechanisms for public projects ⋮ Violations of monotonicity in evolutionary models with sample-based beliefs ⋮ Intervening duality and bargaining with a farmer-landowner example. ⋮ Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination ⋮ Purposive contradiction, intervening duality and the nature of probability ⋮ On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Adjustment patterns and equilibrium selection in experimental signaling games ⋮ Learning to cooperate with Pavlov and adaptive strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma with noise ⋮ Genetic algorithm learning and evolutionary games ⋮ The evolution of money as a medium of exchange ⋮ Forecasting errors and bounded rationality: An example
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