Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination

DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2315zbMath0892.90008OpenAlexW2097454505MaRDI QIDQ1381977

Sanjeev Goyal, Maarten C. W. Janssen

Publication date: 1 April 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repub.eur.nl/pub/11659

zbMATH Keywords

social equilibriumlong run outcomenon-exclusive conventions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (22)

Constrained mobility and the evolution of efficient outcomes ⋮ Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection ⋮ Competing conventions with costly information acquisition ⋮ Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection ⋮ Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games ⋮ Unstable diffusion in social networks ⋮ Dynamics of diffusion on monoplex and multiplex networks: a message-passing approach ⋮ Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choice ⋮ Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection ⋮ A note on general epidemic region for infinite regular graphs ⋮ An evolutionary approach to learning in a changing environment. ⋮ Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example ⋮ On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ ENDOGENOUS NETWORKS IN RANDOM POPULATION GAMES ⋮ Lock-in through passive connections ⋮ A dynamic model of network formation ⋮ Social coordination with locally observable types ⋮ Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice ⋮ Cost heterogeneity and the persistence of bilingualism ⋮ Local interaction on random graphs ⋮ On the co-existence of conventions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
• Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection
• Path dependence and learning from neighbors
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Toward a Theory of International Currency

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