An evolutionary approach to learning in a changing environment.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00117-0zbMath1059.91011OpenAlexW1983131001MaRDI QIDQ1421897

Dana Heller

Publication date: 3 February 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00117-0

zbMATH Keywords

Replicator dynamicsStochastic environment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (4)

A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules ⋮ Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games ⋮ Evolution of theories of mind ⋮ Equilibrium selection under evolutionary game dynamics with optimizing behavior

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• On the relationship between mutation rates and growth rates in a changing environment
• Evolution of smart\(_ n\) players
• Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination
• A biological basis for expected and non-expected utility
• Invariant Distributions and the Limiting Behavior of Markovian Economic Models
• Markov Chains
• A Rational Route to Randomness
• A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
• An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication

This page was built for publication: An evolutionary approach to learning in a changing environment.