An evolutionary approach to learning in a changing environment.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00117-0MaRDI QIDQ1421897zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dana Heller

Publication date 3 February 2004

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00117-0

zbMATH Keywords

Replicator dynamicsStochastic environment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

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• A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
• A biological basis for expected and non-expected utility
• An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
• Evolution of smart\(_ n\) players
• Invariant Distributions and the Limiting Behavior of Markovian Economic Models
• Markov Chains
• Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination
• On the relationship between mutation rates and growth rates in a changing environment
• The probabilistic method. With an appendix on the life and work of Paul Erdős.

Cited in

(10)

• Imitators and optimizers in a changing environment
• Novelty detection improves performance of reinforcement learners in fluctuating, partially observable environments
• Evolution of theories of mind
• A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules
• Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games
• On learning and the evolutionarily stable strategy
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4062893 (Why is no real title available?)
• Equilibrium selection under evolutionary game dynamics with optimizing behavior
• Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules
• Linear learning in changing environments

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