An evolutionary approach to learning in a changing environment.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00117-0zbMATH Open1059.91011OpenAlexW1983131001MaRDI QIDQ1421897FDOQ1421897

Dana Heller

Publication date: 3 February 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00117-0

zbMATH Keywords

Replicator dynamicsStochastic environment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Markov Chains
• The probabilistic method. With an appendix on the life and work of Paul Erdős.
• A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
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• An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
• Invariant Distributions and the Limiting Behavior of Markovian Economic Models
• On the relationship between mutation rates and growth rates in a changing environment
• A biological basis for expected and non-expected utility
• Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination

Cited In (5)

• Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games
• Evolution of theories of mind
• A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Equilibrium selection under evolutionary game dynamics with optimizing behavior

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