Evolution of theories of mind

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.009zbMath1279.91140MaRDI QIDQ417703

Erik Mohlin

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.009

zbMATH Keywords

learning; evolution; fictitious play; cognitive hierarchy; level-\(k\) model; depth of reasoning; theory of mind

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91E10: Cognitive psychology

Related Items

Three steps ahead, Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play, Evolution of mindsight and psychological commitment among strategically interacting agents, Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance, Applying ``theory of mind: theory and experiments, Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli, Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies, Asymptotic stability in the Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic for cooperative games

Uses Software

• Dynamo

Cites Work

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