The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00084-XzbMath1052.91023OpenAlexW2033569522MaRDI QIDQ1400982

Arthur J. Robson

Publication date: 17 August 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00084-x

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamebounded recallIncomplete information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

Three steps ahead ⋮ Evolution of theories of mind ⋮ Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a public good game ⋮ Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli ⋮ Game Theory and Strategic Complexity ⋮ Coordination between a sophisticated and fictitious player

Cites Work

• Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies
• Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak
• Infinite histories and steady orbits in repeated games
• Nonzero-sum two-person repeated games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs
• Repeated games with finite automata
• Duality and Markovian strategies
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
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