Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90009-2zbMath0753.90090MaRDI QIDQ1198164

Dov Samet, Itzhak Gilboa

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90009-2

zbMATH Keywords

two-person repeated game; connected finite automata

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

68Q45: Formal languages and automata

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

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Model-based learning of interaction strategies in multi-agent systems, Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium, Perceptron versus automaton in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, Imperfect equilibrium, Nash equilibrium strategies in repeated games with and without cost of implementation, The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen., Uniqueness and efficiency of Nash equilibrium in a family of randomly generated repeated games., Speculative and hedging interaction model in oil and U.S. dollar markets -- phase transition, Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory, Computer science and decision theory

Cites Work

• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Cooperation and bounded recall
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
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