Cooperation and bounded recall
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Publication:804483
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90003-1zbMATH Open0727.90103OpenAlexW1990631055MaRDI QIDQ804483FDOQ804483
Sylvain Sorin, Robert J. Aumann
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90003-1
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Cited In (65)
- The reciprocity set
- Should I remember more than you? Best responses to factored strategies
- WHEN ASPIRING AND RATIONAL AGENTS STRIVE TO COORDINATE
- Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games
- The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world
- Effect of memory, intolerance, and second-order reputation on cooperation
- Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies
- Evolving networks for social optima in the ``weakest link game
- Evolution, learning, and economic behavior
- Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games
- Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
- Individually rational pure strategies in large games
- Learning correlated equilibria in population games.
- Information leakage forces cooperation
- Monotone games with positive spillovers
- Decision rules with bounded memory
- Limited focus in dynamic games
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- Bayesian boundedly rational agents play the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Small talk and cooperation: A note on bounded rationality
- Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria
- Limited memory can be beneficial for the evolution of cooperation
- Rationality and bounded rationality
- Weighted Boolean Formula Games
- Dynamic pricing of fashion-like multiproducts with customers' reference effect and limited memory
- Strategic polarization
- Team reasoning and the rational choice of payoff-dominant outcomes in games
- Coordination need not be a problem
- Impermanent types and permanent reputations
- Preface: Special issue in honor of the 60th birthday of Sylvain Sorin
- Communication, computability, and common interest games
- Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
- Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
- Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
- Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
- Dynamic stability and learning processes in \(2\times 2\) coordination games
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- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Effects of cueing in cooperative search
- Computer science and decision theory
- Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
- Learning in games by random sampling
- Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory
- Imperfect equilibrium
- Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium
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