Cooperation and bounded recall
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Publication:804483
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90003-1zbMath0727.90103OpenAlexW1990631055MaRDI QIDQ804483
Sylvain Sorin, Robert John Aumann
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90003-1
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Cites Work
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- Unanimity games and Pareto optimality
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- Information leakage forces cooperation
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Sequential Equilibria
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
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