Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games
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Publication:5691279
DOI10.1080/0022250X.1995.9990152zbMath0861.90152MaRDI QIDQ5691279
Publication date: 27 January 1997
Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)
social structure; finitely repeated games; evolutionary simple game theory; loss of cooperation; perennial invasion by mutant-clusters
92D15: Problems related to evolution
91A80: Applications of game theory
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
91D99: Mathematical sociology (including anthropology)
Cites Work
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