Sequential Equilibria
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Publication:3942768
DOI10.2307/1912767zbMath0483.90092MaRDI QIDQ3942768
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912767
optimal strategy; topological structure; equilibrium path; information set; sequential equilibrium; perfect equilibrium; equilibria of extensive games; Selten's trembling-hand perfect equilibria; sequentially rational strategies
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