On blame and reciprocity: theory and experiments

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.006zbMath1400.91120OpenAlexW2597403716MaRDI QIDQ2397629

Andrew Schotter, Boğaçhan Çelen, Mariana Blanco

Publication date: 23 May 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.006

zbMATH Keywords

reciprocityaltruismpsychological gamesblame

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Public goods (91B18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (5)

Intentions-based reciprocity to monetary and non-monetary gifts ⋮ Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: an experimental study ⋮ Perceived motives and reciprocity ⋮ Frustration, aggression, and anger in leader-follower games ⋮ Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees

Cites Work

• Interdependent preference models as a theory of intentions
• Inequality aversion and antisocial punishment
• Dynamic psychological games
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games
• A theory of sequential reciprocity
• Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments
• Testing theories of fairness-intentions matter
• A theory of reciprocity
• Sequential Equilibria
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium

This page was built for publication: On blame and reciprocity: theory and experiments