Tit for tat: foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.003zbMath1281.91066OpenAlexW1983209278MaRDI QIDQ2455658

Uzi Segal, Joel Sobel

Publication date: 26 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.183.2402

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryreciprocityrepresentation theoremsextended preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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