Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
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Publication:3772006
DOI10.2307/1911154zbMath0633.90094OpenAlexW2118929276MaRDI QIDQ3772006
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911154
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