Convergence and approximation results for non-cooperative Bayesian games: Learning theorems

DOI10.1007/BF01213815zbMath0811.90129MaRDI QIDQ1339021

Nicholas C. Yannelis, Leonidas C. Koutsougeras

Publication date: 1 May 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian gamescontinuous time horizon

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Economics of information (91B44) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

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