Bounded rational learning in differential information economies: Core and value

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00057-8zbMath0938.91039MaRDI QIDQ1300421

Nicholas C. Yannelis, Leonidas C. Koutsougeras

Publication date: 1 September 1999

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

private coredynamic economyapproximate notionslimit full information economyprivate value allocationsvalue allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

Related Items (6)

Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies ⋮ Learning and stability of the Bayesian-Walrasian equilibrium ⋮ Continuity properties of the private core ⋮ Market games with asymmetric information: the core ⋮ Debt contracts and cooperative improvements ⋮ The core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information

Cites Work

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• A Walrasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection
• The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information
• The order completeness of some spaces of vector-valued functions
• Competitive Equilibrium Under Uncertainty

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