Debt contracts and cooperative improvements

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2004.04.002MaRDI QIDQ2581791zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stefan Krasa, Tridib Sharma, Anne P. Villamil

Publication date 10 January 2006

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.04.002

zbMATH Keywords

BankruptcyEfficiencyEnforcementFairnessIncomplete informationLiquidationRenegotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25)

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• Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
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Cites work

• A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions
• Bankruptcy and firm finance
• Bounded rational learning in differential information economies: Core and value
• Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's \(M\)-form firm
• Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential information
• Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable: A Comment
• Posterior efficiency
• Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
• The core of an economy with differential information
• The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information

Cited in

(5)

• Interbank borrowing and lending between financially constrained banks
• Reducing the debt: is it optimal to outsource an investment?
• Sorting the good guys from bad: on the optimal audit structure with ex-ante information acquisition
• Computing general equilibrium models with occupational choice and financial frictions
• Bankruptcy and firm finance

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