The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts
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Cites work
- Existence theorems for weak and usual optimal solutions in Lagrange problems with unilateral constraints. I
- Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
- On normal hazard in general equilibrium theory
- Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
Cited in
(17)- Debt contracts and cooperative improvements
- Relational enforcement
- Optimal debt contracts and product market competition with exit and entry
- Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
- Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement
- A continuous-time analysis of optimal restructuring of contracts with costly information disclosure
- Modelling nominal debt contracts and fixed rate debt
- Optimal multilateral contracts
- Financial contract structures and production decision: an option-based optimization
- Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default
- Dynamic costly state verification
- Optimal multilateral contracts
- A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions
- Optimal debt contracts and the single-crossing condition
- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
- Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification
- Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
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