Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information

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Publication:3892022

DOI10.2307/1911125zbMath0446.90008OpenAlexW1970235050MaRDI QIDQ3892022

Robert M. Townsend, Milton Harris

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911125




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