Efficiency and adverse selection

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90038-LzbMath0738.90016OpenAlexW1977833908MaRDI QIDQ1173869

John Payne Bigelow

Publication date: 25 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90038-l

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationadverse selectionconstrained efficiencyefficient allocationslemons model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items

Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection

Cites Work

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• Competitive signalling
• Optimism and experts against adverse selection in a competitive economy
• A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Adverse Selection in the Labour Market
• Informational Equilibrium
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Competition in Salaries, Credentials, and Signaling Prerequisites for Jobs
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem

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