Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
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Publication:3670860
DOI10.2307/1912117zbMath0521.90008OpenAlexW1978180733MaRDI QIDQ3670860
Bengt Holmstrom, Roger B. Myerson
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/495.pdf
Pareto efficiencycomparison of efficiency conceptsdurable decision ruleeconomies with incomplete information
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