Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
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Publication:497941
DOI10.1007/S10058-015-0174-9zbMath1329.91085OpenAlexW2082057353MaRDI QIDQ497941
Emanuele Gerratana, Levent Koçkesen
Publication date: 25 September 2015
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0174-9
asymmetric informationcommitmentstrategic delegationrenegotiation-proofnessrenegotiationentry-deterrencethird-party contracts
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Cites Work
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