Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information

DOI10.1007/S10058-015-0174-9MaRDI QIDQ497941zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Emanuele Gerratana, Levent Koçkesen

Publication date 25 September 2015

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0174-9

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentasymmetric informationstrategic delegationrenegotiation-proofnessrenegotiationentry-deterrencethird-party contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Strategic effects of renegotiation-proof contracts
• Commitment Value of Contracts Under Renegotiation Constraints
• Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation
• Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships
• Unobservable contracts as precommitments

Cites work

• Commitment Value of Contracts Under Renegotiation Constraints
• Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
• Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players
• Games Played Through Agents
• Games played in a contracting environment
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts
• Strategic effects of renegotiation-proof contracts
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.
• Unobservable contracts as precommitments

Cited in

(7)

• Strategic effects of renegotiation-proof contracts
• A theory of credibility under commitment
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Commitment Value of Contracts Under Renegotiation Constraints
• Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation
• Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
• Unobservable contracts as precommitments

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