Unobservable contracts as precommitments

DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0111-9MaRDI QIDQ878404zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Levent Koçkesen

Publication date 26 April 2007

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0111-9

zbMATH Keywords

Strategic delegationUnobservable contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Recommendations

• Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
• Commitment Value of Contracts Under Renegotiation Constraints
• Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
• Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation

Cites work

• Commitment Value of Contracts Under Renegotiation Constraints
• Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation
• Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly
• Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
• Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts
• Unobserved Delegation

Cited in

(9)

• Textbook non-malleable commitments
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Limited observability as a constraint in contract design
• Preordered service in contract enforcement
• Commitment Value of Contracts Under Renegotiation Constraints
• Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts
• Privatization, incentive delegation and foreign direct investment
• Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
• Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions

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