Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- Commitment in Procurement Contracting
- Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
- Limited observability as a constraint in contract design
- Contracting under ex post moral hazard and non-commitment
- Commitment contracts
- Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts
- Commitment Value of Contracts Under Renegotiation Constraints
- Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2131738
Cites work
- An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
- Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
- Commitment and observability in games
- DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE
- Games played in a contracting environment
- Games with imperfectly observable commitment
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games
- Moral hazard and private monitoring
- Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
- The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
- The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly
Cited in
(8)- Functional commitments for all functions, with transparent setup and from SIS
- Costly leader games with a probabilistically non-strategic leader
- Commitment in Procurement Contracting
- Limited observability as a constraint in contract design
- Games played in a contracting environment
- Unobservable contracts as precommitments
- Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
- Monitoring of Performance in Organizational Contracting: The Case of Defense Procurement
This page was built for publication: Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2389297)
