Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105550MaRDI QIDQ2682005zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dmitri Orlov

Publication date 31 January 2023

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105550

zbMATH Keywords

communicationinterventionsmonitoringdynamic contractsrepeated moral hazardperformance evaluations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Dynamic contracts with random monitoring
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• Random inspections and periodic reviews: optimal dynamic monitoring

Cites work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Information feedback in a dynamic tournament
• Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard
• Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts
• Motivational ratings
• Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Optimal contracts with shirking
• Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
• Persistent private information
• Random inspections and periodic reviews: optimal dynamic monitoring
• Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts

Cited in

(14)

• Conditional Monitoring Policy Under Moral Hazard
• Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting
• Input versus output monitoring: Who is the residual claimant?
• Random inspections and periodic reviews: optimal dynamic monitoring
• Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover
• Paying with information
• Dynamic contracts with random monitoring
• Optimal monitoring schedule in dynamic contracts
• Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
• Monitoring innovation
• Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
• Self-Selection and Monitoring in Dynamic Incentive Problems with Incomplete Contracts
• Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints
• Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories

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