Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts
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Publication:2682005
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105550zbMATH Open1506.91081OpenAlexW4296517788MaRDI QIDQ2682005FDOQ2682005
Authors: Dmitri Orlov 
Publication date: 31 January 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105550
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Cites Work
- Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
- Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- Persistent private information
- Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
- Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Optimal contracts with shirking
- Information feedback in a dynamic tournament
- Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
- Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring
- Motivational Ratings
Cited In (7)
- Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting
- Input versus output monitoring: Who is the residual claimant?
- Paying with information
- Conditional Monitoring Policy Under Moral Hazard
- Self-Selection and Monitoring in Dynamic Incentive Problems with Incomplete Contracts
- Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories
- Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
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