Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105550zbMATH Open1506.91081OpenAlexW4296517788MaRDI QIDQ2682005FDOQ2682005

Dmitri Orlov

Publication date: 31 January 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105550

zbMATH Keywords

communicationinterventionsmonitoringdynamic contractsrepeated moral hazardperformance evaluations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
• Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Persistent Private Information
• Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
• Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Optimal Contracts with Shirking
• Information feedback in a dynamic tournament
• Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
• Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring
• Motivational Ratings

Cited In (5)

• Input versus output monitoring: Who is the residual claimant?
• Paying with information
• Conditional Monitoring Policy Under Moral Hazard
• Self-Selection and Monitoring in Dynamic Incentive Problems with Incomplete Contracts
• Commitment and observability in a contracting environment

Recommendations

• Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring 👍 👎
• Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring 👍 👎
• Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints 👍 👎
• Dynamic contracts with random monitoring 👍 👎
• Optimal Monitoring Schedule in Dynamic Contracts 👍 👎

This page was built for publication: Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2682005)