Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts
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Publication:3382373
DOI10.1093/restud/rdw029zbMath1471.91240OpenAlexW3022890092MaRDI QIDQ3382373
Yuliy Sannikov, Peter M. DeMarzo
Publication date: 21 September 2021
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/27caf4f1d81db8b72ed53262e362e2778fe8c5ec
Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)
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