Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option
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Publication:6077280
DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00842-7zbMath1522.91150OpenAlexW4367181823MaRDI QIDQ6077280
Publication date: 25 September 2023
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00842-7
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