Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option

DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00842-7MaRDI QIDQ6077280zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jin Hyuk Choi, Kookyoung Han

Publication date 25 September 2023

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00842-7

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionmoral hazardoptimal contractprivate information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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Cites work

• A mechanism for eliciting a probability distribution
• A Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilities
• A principal-agent model of sequential testing
• Calibrated incentive contracts
• Continuous-time stochastic control and optimization with financial applications
• Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
• Dynamic belief elicitation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1546853 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts
• Optimal contract for outsourcing information acquisition
• Optimal contracts for experimentation
• Optimal Stopping Rules
• The binarized scoring rule

Cited in

(4)

• Delegated contracting, information, and internal control
• Optimal contract for outsourcing information acquisition
• Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
• Benefiting from bias: delegating to encourage information acquisition

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