A principal-agent model of sequential testing

DOI10.3982/TE914zbMath1395.91277MaRDI QIDQ4586108

Lucas Maestri, Dino Gerardi

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitiondynamic mechanism designsequential testing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

Related Items (11)

Hierarchical experimentation ⋮ Delegated Concept Testing in New Product Development ⋮ Learning, belief manipulation and optimal relationship termination ⋮ Robust incentives for information acquisition ⋮ Monitoring innovation ⋮ Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option ⋮ Innovation through competitive experimentation ⋮ Optimal adaptive testing: Informativeness and incentives ⋮ Learning from failures: optimal contracts for experimentation and production ⋮ Impacts of uncertain project duration and asymmetric risk sensitivity information in project management ⋮ Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning

Cites Work

• Monopoly and product quality
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Will truth out? -- An advisor's quest to appear competent
• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs

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