Hierarchical experimentation
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Publication:1622365
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.06.006zbMath1417.91148OpenAlexW4249061209MaRDI QIDQ1622365
Junichiro Ishida, Chia-Hui Chen
Publication date: 19 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/53874
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) 2-person games (91A05) Experimental studies (91A90)
Cites Work
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