Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons
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Publication:2859506
DOI10.3982/ECTA9278zbMath1274.91097OpenAlexW3124948001MaRDI QIDQ2859506
Publication date: 8 November 2013
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9278
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44) Dynamic games (91A25) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
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