Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection
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Publication:1995282
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105124zbMath1458.91203OpenAlexW2952486761MaRDI QIDQ1995282
William Fuchs, Brett Green, Vladimir Asriyan
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105124
adverse selectioninformation aggregationtransparencydecentralized marketsinformation designoptimal information policy
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Cites Work
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