Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection
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Publication:1995282
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105124zbMATH Open1458.91203OpenAlexW2952486761MaRDI QIDQ1995282FDOQ1995282
William Fuchs, Brett Green, Vladimir Asriyan
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105124
transparencyadverse selectioninformation aggregationdecentralized marketsinformation designoptimal information policy
Cites Work
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Cited In (6)
- Information aggregation in large collective purchases
- Adverse selection and costly information acquisition in asset markets
- Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information
- Retracted: ``Market fragmentation and information aggregation
- Imperfect information transmission and adverse selection in asset markets
- Market-making with search and information frictions
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