Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
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Publication:4586042
DOI10.3982/TE1808zbMath1395.91007OpenAlexW3122903325MaRDI QIDQ4586042
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Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1808
incomplete informationcorrelated equilibriumBayes correlated equilibriumBayes Nash equilibriumBlackwell orderingrobust predictionsinformation structure, sufficiency
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