Information design in multistage games

DOI10.3982/TE4769MaRDI QIDQ6180413zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Miltiadis Makris, Ludovic Renou

Publication date 19 January 2024

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.13482

zbMATH Keywords

Bayes' correlated equilibriumcommunication equilibriuminformation designinformation structuresmultistage gamesrevelation principlesequential communication equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Abstract: This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2016) to multi-stage games. We demonstrate the power of our characterization results by applying them to a number of illustrative examples and applications.

Recommendations

• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Correlated equilibria and communication in games
• Sequential Information Design
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria

Cites work

• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited
• Extensive-form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity
• Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
• Mechanism design with aftermarkets: cutoff mechanisms
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Optimal dynamic information provision
• Rationalizability, observability, and common knowledge
• Repeated Games
• Reputational bidding
• Robust dynamic implementation
• Sequential Information Design
• The revelation principle in multistage games

Cited in

(7)

• Contracting over persistent information
• Interacting mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems
• ``Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies: back to the roots
• Lemonade from lemons: information design and adverse selection
• Monopoly pricing with optimal information
• Dynamic information design in an entry game
• Benefits and challenges of ambiguous product information

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