Lemonade from lemons: information design and adverse selection

DOI10.3982/TE6451MaRDI QIDQ6846518zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Navin Kartik

Publication date 11 March 2026

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/TE6451

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasionbuyer-optimal informationinterdependent valuesmarket segmentationmonopoly pricingprice discrimination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• Adverse Selection in the Labour Market
• Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information
• Bargaining with endogenous information
• Buyer-optimal extensionproof information
• Comparing location experiments
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Information design in multistage games
• Informational robustness in intertemporal pricing
• Monopoly and product quality
• Multi-dimensional screening: buyer-optimal learning and informational robustness
• Optimal Auction Design
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Revisiting the lemons market
• Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
• Robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple goods
• Sequential Equilibria
• Sequential Information Design
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

Cited in

(1)

• Benefits and challenges of ambiguous product information

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