Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation

DOI10.3982/ECTA14993zbMath1419.91323arXiv1603.06165MaRDI QIDQ4644799

Songzi Du

Publication date: 9 January 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1603.06165

zbMATH Keywords

full surplus extractionlarge marketscommon-value auctionrobust mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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