Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver

DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01299-5zbMATH Open1482.91040OpenAlexW2895715802MaRDI QIDQ2074048FDOQ2074048

Authors: Ju Hu, Xi Weng 

Publication date: 4 February 2022

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01299-5

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zbMATH Keywords

robustnessambiguity aversionprivate informationBayesian persuasionmaxmin utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

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Cited In (14)

• Persuasion under ambiguity
• Regret minimization in online Bayesian persuasion: handling adversarial receiver's types under full and partial feedback models
• Persuasion with ambiguous receiver preferences
• Ambiguous persuasion
• Persuasion with unknown beliefs
• Persuasion and receiver's news
• Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion
• Constrained persuasion with private information
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Rationality-robust information design: Bayesian persuasion under quantal response
• Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
• Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
• Resisting persuasion
• Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: robust (Bayesian) persuasion

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