Resisting persuasion
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Publication:2074039
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Cites work
- A note on cheap talk and burned money
- Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
- Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?
- Cheap talk and burned money
- Communication via a strategic mediator
- Competition in persuasion
- Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
- Experimental design to persuade
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Money burning in the theory of delegation
- Noisy persuasion
- Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
- Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Tax me if you can! Optimal nonlinear income tax between competing governments
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