Information design for weighted voting

DOI10.1007/S00199-024-01599-0MaRDI QIDQ6966936zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Toygar T. Kerman, Anastas P. Tenev

Publication date 26 June 2025

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00199-024-01599-0

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasioninformation designprivate communicationshareholder votingstrategic voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Voting theory (91B12)

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