Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
From MaRDI portal
Publication:694724
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.006zbMath1258.91053MaRDI QIDQ694724
Publication date: 13 December 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.006
91B12: Voting theory
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Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections, The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study, Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules, Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections, Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility, A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs, Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule, Pivotal persuasion, Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences, Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments, The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting, Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations, Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers, Poisson voting games under proportional rule, On the consensus effect, Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?, Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study, Pandering and electoral competition, The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition, Large elections and interim turnout
Cites Work
- Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
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- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
- On the rate of multivariate Poisson convergence
- Large Poisson games
- Population uncertainty and Poisson games
- Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?
- Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
- Would rational voters acquire costly information?
- Aggregating Information by Voting: The Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
