Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
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Publication:694724
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.09.006zbMATH Open1258.91053OpenAlexW2097975722MaRDI QIDQ694724FDOQ694724
Authors: M. C. Fu 
Publication date: 13 December 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.006
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Cites Work
- On the rate of multivariate Poisson convergence
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
- Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
- Would rational voters acquire costly information?
- Large Poisson games
- Population uncertainty and Poisson games
- Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Aggregating information by voting: the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses
- Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
- Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?
Cited In (29)
- Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule
- Costly voting, turnout, and candidate valence
- Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers
- The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study
- Preferences, social capital, and compulsory volunteering
- Pivotal persuasion
- Pandering and electoral competition
- Poisson voting games under proportional rule
- Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments
- Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
- Linear voting rules
- Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections
- The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting
- Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?
- The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition
- Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
- Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing
- Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition?
- Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections
- Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
- Large elections and interim turnout
- A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
- Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study
- Cost-conscious voters in referendum elections
- On the consensus effect
- Full information equivalence in large elections
- Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences
- Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility
- Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations
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