Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem

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Publication:1272980


DOI10.1006/game.1997.0610zbMath0912.90291MaRDI QIDQ1272980

Roger B. Myerson

Publication date: 2 December 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1103.pdf


91B12: Voting theory

91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games


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