Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors

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Publication:1208130


DOI10.1007/BF00187435zbMath0825.90042MaRDI QIDQ1208130

Sven Berg

Publication date: 16 May 1993

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00187435


91B14: Social choice


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