Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
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Publication:763358
DOI10.1007/s11238-009-9170-2zbMath1274.91168OpenAlexW2096781379WikidataQ30054738 ScholiaQ30054738MaRDI QIDQ763358
Serguei Kaniovski, Alexander Yu. Zeigraev
Publication date: 9 March 2012
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9170-2
Related Items (7)
The importance of expertise in group decisions ⋮ A Condorcet jury theorem for couples ⋮ Epistemic democracy with correlated voters ⋮ Bounds on the competence of a homogeneous jury ⋮ Exact bounds on the probability of at least \(k\) successes in \(n\) exchangeable Bernoulli trials as a function of correlation coefficients ⋮ Collective bias models in two-tier voting systems and the democracy deficit ⋮ Measuring voting power in games with correlated votes using Bahadur's parametrisation
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