Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
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Publication:763358
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4100372 (Why is no real title available?)
- A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem
- A note on the Condorcet jury theorem with supermajority voting rules
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
- Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors
- Deliberation and Voting Rules
- Deliberative voting
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Information acquisition in committees
- Monotonicity in Condorcet's jury theorem with dependent voters
- The significance of independent decisions in uncertain dichotomous choice situations
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
Cited in
(13)- A Condorcet jury theorem for couples
- The importance of expertise in group decisions
- Collective bias models in two-tier voting systems and the democracy deficit
- Optimizing voting order on sequential juries: a median voter theorem and beyond
- Epistemic democracy with correlated voters
- Considerations on jury size and composition using lower probabilities
- Probability of majority inversion with three states and interval preferences
- An invariance result for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
- Why are experts correlated? Decomposing correlations between judges
- Measuring voting power in games with correlated votes using Bahadur's parametrisation
- Bounds on the competence of a homogeneous jury
- Exact bounds on the probability of at least \(k\) successes in \(n\) exchangeable Bernoulli trials as a function of correlation coefficients
- Aggregation of correlated votes and Condorcet's jury theorem
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